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COMMENTS
THE SPECIFICALLY DEFINED TRADE SECRET: AN
APPROACH TO PROTECTION
I. INTRODUCTION
The commercial value of any secret information is derived from
both the substantive content and the restricted availability of the
information. Quite often, the combination of these two factors consti-
tutes an extremely valuable trade secret. The variety of formulas,
processes, methods, devices, and compilations which may qualify as
trade secrets is limited only by imagination and ingenuity. The char-
acter of the information, if unique or unusual and competitively
advantageous to the business in which it is used, is not material.1
In the United States' system of free enterprise and competition,
trade secrets have become a key to industrial power,2 representing
intangible assets which in many cases are a practical requirement for
competitive businesses.' In contrast to patent rights, which are often
0 1987 by Julie A. Henderson
1. The term "trade secrets" is defined very broadly under California law and generally
encompasses information that has some value and is not generally known. CAL. CIV. CODE §
3426.1(d) (West Supp. 1987). "Thus, the ubiquitous 'secret blend of 11 herbs and spices'
could be as worthy of protection as a complex circuit diagram for a new computer under
development." Pooley, Better Protection for Trade Secrets, 5 CAL. LAW. No. 8 51, 51 (1985)[hereinafter Better Protection]. See also Futurecraft Corp. v. Clary Corp., 205 Cal. App. 2d279, 289, 23 Cal. Rptr. 198, 211 (1962); Ungar Elecs. Tools, Inc. v. Sid Ungar Co., 192 Cal.
App. 2d 398, 403, 13 Cal. Rptr. 268, 271 (1961); Riess v. Sanford, 47 Cal. App. 2d 244, 246-
47, 117 P.2d 694, 695 (1941).
2. Granzeier, Guarding Against Industrial Espionage, 53 MGMT. REV. 40, 41 (Jan.
1964). See also Hutter, Trade Secret Misappropriation: A Lawyer's Practical Approach to
the Case Law, I W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 2 n.1 (1978).
3. Significantly, the increasingly rigid scrutiny applied by courts in examining patents in
infringement cases, along with the tremendous expense and amount of time spent in obtaining
patents (the average waiting time is 19 months) has inspired owners of patentable ideas that
provide a competitive advantage to seek alternative protection for their ideas. Sutton, Develop-
ments and Trends in Trade Secrets Law, ATTORNEY'S GUIDE TO TRADE SECRETS § 1.3(1971) [hereinafter Sutton]. See also J. POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS: HOW TO PROTECT YOUR
IDEAS AND ASSETS 26-27 (1982) [hereinafter POOLEY TRADE SECRETS]. Moreover, while the
courts appear to be holding patents invalid with greater frequency, the number of decisions
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fraught with bureaucratic delays and lengthy waiting periods for
government grants, trade secret rights can be established relatively
easily by the conduct or agreement of the parties." However, every
business whose profits depend upon the actual or potential use5 of
trade secrets risks sustaining considerable losses in the event that
such confidential information is used without authorization or is dis-
closed through inadvertence. 6 In order to prevent such unauthorized
use or inadvertent disclosure, protective measures must be exercised
carefully and continuously.
7
The preservation of secrecy is no easy task in this age of rapid
granting protection for trade secrets is on the increase. Sutton, supra, at § 1.3. The Commis-
sioners' Prefatory Note to the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) points out, "In view of the
substantial number of patents that are invalidated by the courts, many businesses now elect to
protect commercially valuable information through reliance upon the state law of trade secret
protection." UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. §§ 1-12, 537 (Commissioner's Prefatory
Note) (1980) [hereinafter UTSAJ.
In addition, trade secrets have gained importance in the commercial arena as a result of
rapidly changing technology which, in so many fields, is outstripping the existing laws
intending to encourage and protect inventions and innovations. M. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS
LAW § 1.01 (1985).
4. M. JAGER, supra note 3, at § 1.01. A trade secret right is established upon the
creation of the idea in concrete form and continues so long as secrecy is maintained. Id.
5. Although it is likely that the owner of a trade secret will employ that secret in his or
her business operations, use by its developer in his or her business is not a prerequisite for
trade secret protection. Sinclair v. Aquarius Elecs. Inc., 42 Cal. App. 3d 216, 222, 116 Cal.
Rptr. 654, 658 (1974). Moreover, neither California law nor the UTSA (from which the
California law was derived) require an actual opportunity or the acquired means to put a
trade secret to use in order for information to qualify as a protectible trade secret. Information
may qualify as a trade secret even though it is not continuously used in one's business. In fact,
information whose commercial value is the result of lengthy and expensive research which
proves that certain processes will not work may be protected as a trade secret. CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 3426.1, (Senate Legislative Committee Comment) (West Supp. 1987) [hereinafter Senate
Comment]; UTSA, supra note 3, at 537 (Commissioner's Prefatory Note).
6. Hutter, supra note 2, at 2. "In fact, not knowing what constitutes proprietary infor-
mation is one way many entrepreneurs may have lost their valuable technology in the past."
POOLEY TRADE SECRETS, supra note 3, at 5.
7. Feldman, The Trade Secrets Protection Cycle, CAl.. LAW. 41, 41 (May 1986).
However, unreasonable precautions to prevent another from doing that which he or she
should not do in.the first place are not necessary for trade secret protection. For example, in
E.L duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, the defendants took aerial photographs of the
new construction of plaintiff's methanol plant. Because the plant was still under construction,
parts of plaintiff's secret process for producing methanol were exposed to view from directly
above the construction area (after construction, the finished plant would have protected much
of the process from view). The court held that to require duPont to put a roof over the unfin-
ished plant to guard its secret process would have imposed "an enormous expense to prevent
nothing more than a schoolboy's trick." Although reasonable precautions against predators
may be required, "an impenetrable fortress" is an unreasonable requirement which industrial
inventors should not be burdened with in order to protect "the fruits of their efforts." 431 F.2d
1012, 1016-17 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1970). See also Senate Comment,
supra note 5; UTSA, supra note 3, at 537 (Commissioner's Prefatory Note).
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electronic, chemical, genetic, and atomic development. Countless
skilled and expert employees are engaged in the ongoing process of
developing potential trade secrets. The keen competition for employ-
ees of this caliber frequently results in widespread employee mobility
and an increased potential for unauthorized use and disclosure of
trade secrets. It is thus the role of the courts to protect an employer's
trade secret ownership rights while preventing any undue restraints
upon an individual in the pursuit of his or her livelihood or upon
public access to scientific and economic advances.'
This comment will address the issue of trade secret protection in
the context of the employer-employee relationship. More specifically,
this comment will explore the basic theories of trade secret protection
and the competing policies which underlie this protection. Next, the
inter-relationship of these theories and policies will be examined in
view of the need for specifically defined trade secrets in the
employer-employee relationship. In addition, the consequences of an
employer's failure to specifically define trade secrets will be
addressed along with the advisability of an employer's controlled dis-
closure of specifically defined secrets to employees whose assistance is
vital to the valuable use of that information. Finally, several proce-
dures will be proposed to demonstrate how an employer can utilize a
specific definition to better insure trade secret protection.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Basis of Trade Secret Protection
1. The Supporting Theories
In recent years, the rise of industrial espionage9 and employee
8. Futurecraft, 205 Cal. App. 2d at 284-85, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 208 (quoting the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court in Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 575-76, 160 A.2d 430, 433
(1960)). See also American Paper & Packaging Prods., Inc. v. Kirgan, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1318,
1322, 228 Cal. Rptr. 713, 715 (1986) (wherein the court balanced the protections provided a
former employee under California Business and Professions Code section 16600 against the
protections provided a former employer for confidential information and trade secrets).
9. "Industrial espionage" has been defined as "the practice of engaging in surreptitious
surveillance for the purpose of discovering a businessman's secrets." Comment, Industrial
Espionage: Piracy of Secret Scientific and Technical Information, 14 UCLA L. REV. 911,
911 (1967). The prevalence of industrial espionage and the corresponding need for protection
against such conduct was acknowledged in E.I. duPont deNemours Co.:
[l]ndustrial espionage . . . has become a popular sport in some segments of our
industrial community. However, our devotion to free wheeling industrial com-
petition must not force us into accepting the law of the jungle as the standard of
morality expected in our commercial relations . . . commercial privacy must be
protected from espionage which could not have been reasonably anticipated or
prevented.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27
mobility 0 has dramatically increased the likelihood of losses that oc-
cur when trade secrets are used without authorization." The goal of
trade secret law is to protect commercially valuable ideas against
such losses by providing the owner of a trade secret with the funda-
mental right to relief from harm, actual or potential, 2 caused when
his trade secret is misappropriated. 3
Trade secret protection is warranted only where there is some
"legal relationship", such as a contractual agreement or confidential
relationship giving rise to a duty not to disclose. 4 Thus, the combi-
nation of a confidential relationship and information subject to
protection as a trade secret gives rise to a cause of action for trade
secret misappropriation. 5 In the context of an employer-employee
relationship, once the existence of a trade secret has been established,
legal relief is predicated on the trust and confidence which is estab-
lished when the employer discloses a pre-existing trade secret to his
or her employee. A pledge of secrecy is thus implicitly extracted from
the employee and remains enforceable even after the employment re-
lationship comes to an end.'
431 F.2d at 1016. According to one estimate, approximately $4 billion worth of trade secrets
are misappropriated annually in the United States. See Hutter, supra note 2, at 3. See also M.
JAGER, supra note 3, at § 1.04.
10. When key executives and technicians change jobs, they often take with them infor-
mation acquired during the course of their previous employment. Frequently these employees
do not hesitate to forward their former employers' confidential information because their loyal-
ties shift to their new employers. Hutter, supra note 2, at 3.
11. Id. at 2-3.
12. Under California law, an injunction may issue to prevent actual or potential misap-
propriation of a trade secret. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.2(a) (West Supp. 1987). Damages,
however, are available only for the actual loss or unjust enrichment caused by misappropria-
tion. Id. at § 3426.3(a).
13. Klitzke, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 64 MARQ. L. REV. 277, 277 (1980). A
trade secret is misappropriated when knowledge of the information is acquired through
improper means such as "fraud, use of surreptitious means or participation in a wrongful
conspiracy." Id. In addition, a trade secret is misappropriated if it is used with knowledge that
it was tortiously obtained by another or if its use is in breach of a confidential relationship. d.
at 279-80.
14. Surgidev Corp. v. Eye Technology, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 661, 694 (D. Minn. 1986)
(applying both California and Minnesota law) (citing 1 R. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE
SECRE-rs § 7.07111 (1987) (Rel. 18-5/84)).
15. Surgidev, 648 F. Supp. at 694-95.
16. Futurecraft, 205 Cal. App. 2d at 285-86, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 209. Therefore, in every
employment relationship wherein trade secrets are disclosed there exists an implied covenant
which prevents employees from utilizing, for their benefit or for the benefit of others, any trade
secrets acquired during the course of their employment. By-Buk Co. v. Printed Cellophane
Tape Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 157, 164, 329 P.2d 147, 151 (1958).
It is important to note, however, that not every employment relationship is accompanied
by a confidential relationship. In Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Guardian Glass Co., the alleged
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Trade secret protection is not intended to reward or promote
the secrecy of the development and maintenance of processes or infor-
mation,17 though this may be the result. The aims of trade secret
protection are rather: (1) to maintain standards of commercial eth-
ics18 through protection against breaches of confidentiality and the
use of improper1 methods to obtain information;"0 and (2) to
encourage research, innovation, development and use of new ideas."
trade secret thieves were mold makers who earned an hourly wage of $2.75. Neither man was
informed that his work involved proprietary or confidential information, nor did either so un-
derstand. The court thus found that no confidential relationship existed. 322 F. Supp. 854,
864-65 (E.D. Mich. 1970).
17. Jostens Inc. v. National Computer Sys., 318 N.W.2d 691, 701 (Minn. 1982) (citing
I R. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 12.01 (1987) (Rel. 20-6/85)).
Trade secrets law in general and the UTSA in particular were never intended to function
as a "blanket post facto restraint on trade" (which by definition would prevent dissemination
of the information protected). Thus, the "right to impose contractual restraints upon the dis-
closure of information which can be protected as a trade secret does not automatically trans-
form that information into a "trade secret" in the absence of such restraints. See Fleming Sales
Co. v. Bailey, 611 F. Supp. 507, 511 (N.D. Ill. 1985), ("Knowledge derived from experience
does not automatically carry with it the ability to forestall others who have shared that experi-
ence and thus that knowledge)." Id.
18. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974); Senate Comment, supra
note 5; UTSA, supra note 3, at 542, § 1 (Commissioner's Comment). The desire to uphold
business morality has been an ongoing theme as the common law of trade secrets developed in
the United States over the past century, and the encouragement of rising standards of fairness
and commercial morality continues to be the keystone of trade secret law in the courts. M.
JAGER, supra note 3, at 1-7.
19. "'Improper' will always be a word of many nuances, determined by time, place,
and circumstances. . . .Clearly, however, one of its commandments does say thou shall not
appropriate a trade secret through deviousness under circumstances in which countervailing
defenses are not reasonably available.'" E.L duPont deNemours & Co., 431 F.2d at 1017.
Thus, "[i]mproper means could include otherwise lawful conduct which is improper under the
circumstances; e.g., an airplane overflight used as aerial reconnaissance to determine the com-
petitor's plant layout during construction of the plant." Senate Comment, supra note 5 (citing
E.L duPont deNemours, 431 F.2d 1012); UTSA, supra note 3, at 542 (Commissioner's Com-
ment) (citing E.L duPont deNemours, 431 F.2d 1012).
20. Jostens, 318 N.W.2d at 701.
21. M. JAGER, supra note 3, at § 1.04. (quoting Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 484, and
Brunswick Corp. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 16 II1. 2d 475, 404 N.E.2d 205, 207 (1980)).
Jager notes that this policy area has proved to be:
[RIather troublesome for the courts, because of the continuing conflict between
trade secret law and the related laws governing patents and restraints of trade.
On the one hand, the policy against restraints of trade is designed to promote
free competition by allowing unfettered use of ideas in the public domain. On
the other hand, the policy underlying patent and trade secret laws is to
encourage the development and use of new ideas by rewarding inventors and
innovators with some measure of exclusive property rights in the idea.
M. JAGER, supra note 3, at § 1.04.
Research and innovation are encouraged by virtue of the legal mechanism for dissemina-
tion and productive use of proprietary information provided by trade secret law. In the absence
of trade secret protection, experienced and informed inventors would be unlikely to disclose
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Ownership of a trade secret represents only a proprietary right
which is protected against usurpation by unfair means. Such owner-
ship does not confer a corresponding monopoly in the use of that
information, 2 as in the case of patent23 and copyright24 ownership.
The protection of trade secret rights has been based on a
number of different theories. Prior to the formulation and limited
adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act25 (UTSA), courts were
free to draw upon a variety of legal concepts in deciding trade secrets
cases.26 The traditional theory of protection is based upon the notion
that a trade secret is property.2" Courts have also frequently relied
their ideas to others for consideration. The potential nonproductive hoarding of ideas is, how-
ever, tempered by the acceptance and enforcement of private trade secret agreements.
Thousands of such existing trade secret agreements have fostered billions of dollars of eco-
nomic activity within the United States and abroad. M. JAGER, supra note 3, at § 1.04.
22. Futurecraft, 205 Cal. App. 2d at 283, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 207 (citing Wexler v.
Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 160 A.2d 430 (1960)); Chicago Lock Co. v. Fanberg, 676 F.2d 400,
404 (9th Cir. 1982). See also Sinclair, 42 Cal. App. 3d at 226, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 661.
23. Protection of a patent owner's exclusive right to use the patented process lasts for 17
years, after which time the patented process is fully disclosed and dedicated to the public. 35
U.S.C. § 154 (1982). See also Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 480.
24. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982). See id. §§ 107-118 (for limitations on the exclusive use of
copyrights). Except as otherwise provided, a copyright in a work created after January 1, 1978
endures for a term consisting of the life of the author and fifty years after the author's death.
Id. at § 302.
25. The UTSA was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws in 1979. Commissioners' Note, supra note 5. Since then, sixteen states have
adopted the Uniform Act: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Kansas,
Louisiana, Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426 (West Supp.
1987).
26. Sutton, supra note 3, at 4-5. As a result, "a full understanding of confidential infor-
mation law commands an appreciation that is only partly tort law, only slightly property law,
is largely contract law, and still more largely equity law in the sense of its being the emotional
reaction of the conscience of the judge without confinement by the forms of property, tort, or
contract law." Id. (quoting Arnold, Problems in Trade Secret Law, Summary of Proceedings,
1961 ABA SEC. OF PAr., TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT L. REP. 248, 251 (1961)).
Note that in states which have not adopted the UTSA, courts continue to be free to draw
upon these various theories. In California, however, to the extent that such principles embod-
ied in case law are in conflict with the dictates of the UTSA, they are no longer controlling.
American Paper, 183 Cal. App. 3d at 1324, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 716-17.
27. Sloan, Trade Secrets: Real Toads in a Conceptual Garden, 1 W. ST. U.L. REV.
113, 113 (1973) [hereinafter Sloan].
Although some commentators are reluctant to characterize trade secrets as prop-
erty, the courts have overwhelmingly supported the property view. That view
characterizes as property the bundle of rights of the owner of a trade secret. The
right to prevent unauthorized use or disclosure by one standing in a contractual
or confidential relationship to the owner is the fundamental property right.
I R. MI.GRIM, MILIGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.01 (1987) (Rel. 24-5/87). See also Sin-
clair, 42 Cal. App. 3d 216, 116 Cal. Rptr. 654 (1974). In fact, courts have been discussing
"property" rights in trade secrets for at least a hundred years. Sutton, supra note 3, at 5
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upon contract theory, either express or implied, to afford trade secret
protection.2" The modern approach to trade secret protection is pred-
icated upon the tortious breach of a confidential relationship.29 Fi-
nally, courts have also relied upon the theory of unjust enrichment as
an alternative ground for trade secret protection. 0
As one commentator has noted, the distinctions between the
(citing Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452 (1868) and Olschewski v. Hudson, 87 Cal. App.
282, 286, 262 P. 43, 45 (1927)). This property right theory was recently strongly affirmed by
the Supreme Court in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, wherein the Court stated, "Itjhe general
perception of trade secrets as property is consonant with a notion of property that extends
beyond land and tangible goods and includes the products of an individual's labor and inven-
tion." 467 U.S. 986, 1003 (1984) (quoting 2 W. BLACKSTONE, 405).
28. M. JAGER, supra note 3, at § 4.0111]. Contract theory is most often invoked when
an express contract exists. Another common application of contract theory occurs where a
contract controlling the use of trade secrets is implied from the facts. Finally, quasi-contract, or
implied-in-law contract theory has been employed as a legal fiction to explain the "socially
desirable result of affording protection for trade secrets" where a confidential relationship
exists. An implied-in-law contract can be defeated, however, if disclosure of the trade secret
occurs in the absence of limitations on disclosure or use, or if a contractual relationship is
expressly disclaimed. Id.
29. See RESTATEMENT (FIsT) OF TORTS § 757 (1939); M. JAGER, supra note 3, at §
4.01121; Davies v. Krasna, 245 Cal. App. 2d 535, 547, 54 Cal. Rptr. 37, 45 (1966) ("Use by
one to whom an idea has been disclosed in confidence is the usual basis of liability in the trade
secrets cases." Id.). The significance of the tort theory of trade secret protection is that the
nature of the property or information sought to be protected is de-emphasized, while the per-
sonal relationship of the parties at the time of disclosure represents the focal point of the
analysis. As the court in Futurecraft noted, "[a] basis for protection of trade secrets is that the
recipient obtains through a confidential relationship something he did not previously know."
Futurecraft, 205 Cal. App. 2d at 288, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 210.
A confidential relationship has been said to arise where "one party places its trust in a
second party, the second party knows of the trust reposed in him, and under the circumstances
of the case breach of that trust is wrongful." Surgidev, 648 F. Supp. at 695.
30. Sloan, supra note 27, at 113.
The UTSA appears to embrace all four theories of protection. See Pooley, supra note 1,
at 52. "Misappropriation occurs chiefly through acquisition by 'improper means,' which in-
cludes everything from outright theft to breach of a duty to maintain secrecy." Id.; American
Paper, 183 Cal. App. 3d at 1324, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 716 (In discussing customer lists as
information subject to trade secret protection, the court stated, "[p]rior to the adoption of the
UTSA, decisions . . . were founded on equitable principles of common law. To a large extent,
these principles have been engrossed by the UTSA." Id.). Liability for misappropriation of a
trade secret results from either the disclosure or use of another's trade secret absent express or
implied consent by one who "[ulsed improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret"
(property right) or "[a]t the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that his
knowledge of the trade secret was: (i) [d]erived from or through a person who had utilized
improper means to acquire it;" (property right) "(ii) [alcquired under circumstances giving rise
to a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use;" (breach of confidential relationship) "or (iii)
Idlerived from or through a person who owed a duty to the person seeking relief to maintain
its secrecy or limit its use. .. . ." (breach of confidential relationship/contract). CAL. CIv.
CODE § 3426.1(b)(2)(A),(B) (West Supp. 1987). In addition, damages are available for the
unjust enrichment caused by misappropriation that is not taken into account in computing
damages for actual loss. Id. at § 3426.3(a).
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theoretical bases for trade secret protection are often academic and
without practical importance.81 Due to the recurring difficulty of.
placing trade secrets cases into precise theoretical categories, courts
frequently gloss over these differences, at times discussing property,
contract and tort theories simultaneously in affording relief.82 The
property concept is significant because a trade secret must have inde-
pendent value to be protected. Therefore, if a trade secret is obtained
honestly, no cause of action for misappropriation exists."3
2. Misappropriation and the Policies Behind Protection
In the typical case of alleged trade secret misappropriation, a
highly skilled employee has, during the course of employment,
acquired knowledge of the employer's allegedly confidential business
information3' or designed either a product for the employer" or im-
provements to the employer's product. 6 Whenever such an employee
changes employment and goes to work for either a competitor of the
former employer or for himself or herself, the potential exists that
some of the employee's previously acquired knowledge, designs, in-
ventions or methods of improvement will be made available to the
new employer or put to the employee's own use.3 7
Whether or not such information can be protected as a trade
secret depends on the nature of the information. In general, informa-
tion will be subject to protection if it affords the ex-employer a
competitive or economic advantage 8 over those unaware of it.39 Con-
31. M. JAGER, supra note 3, at § 4.01[3].
32. Id.
33. Sutton, supra note 3, at § 1.6.
34. See, e.g., American Paper, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1318, 228 Cal. Rptr. 713 (customer
lists); Futurecraft, 205 Cal. App. 2d 279, 23 Cal. Rptr. 198 (1962) (valve designs); Fleming
Sales Co., 611 F. Supp. 507 (customer lists and information); Gordon v. Landau, 49 Cal. 2d
690, 321 P.2d 456 (1958) (customer lists).
35. See, e.g., Cubic Corp. v. Marty, 185 Cal. App. 3d 438, 229 Cal. Rptr. 828 (1986)
(employee-invented electronic warfare simulator). Employment contracts governing rights to
employee inventions are regulated by statute in California. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 2870-2872
(West Supp. 1987).
36. Daniel Orifice Fitting Co. v. Whalen, 198 Cal. App. 2d 791, 18 Cal. Rptr. 659
(1962) (valve designs and patterns).
37. Von Kalinowski, Key Employees and Trade Secrets, 47 VA. L. REV. 583, 583
(1961).
38. The competitive advantage afforded by the trade secret must be commercial. In
holding that a trade secret cannot be based on spiritual advantage, the district court in Reli-
gious Technology Center v. Wollersheim stated, "Itlo be protectible as a trade secret under
either Restatement section 757 or the new California statute [Civil Code sections 3426-
3426.101, the confidential material must convey an actual or potential commercial advantage,
presumably measurable in dollar terms." 796 F.2d 1076, 1090 (9th Cir. 1986). See also CAL.
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versely, to the extent that the information represents intellectual tools
of trade (and is, therefore, presumably known by competitors),'0 or
is readily ascertainable through proper means, it cannot be protected
as a trade secret."1 Any other rule would frustrate the free market
objective of maximizing available resources to foster competition.'
California has a strong public policy in favor of the right of an
individual to pursue any calling, business or profession,"3 including
CIv. CODE § 3426.1(d)(1) (West Supp. 1987). In addition, the expenditure of time and money
in the development of a process or design does not alone support a finding of competitive
advantage. Rather, under the present state of the art, a prospective competitor must be unable
to develop a process or design with a similar expenditure of time and money. Electro-Craft
Corp. v. Controlled Motion Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 901. (Minn. 1983).
39. Of course, the information must still be the subject of reasonable measures under-
taken to preserve its secrecy. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d)(2) (West Supp. 1987);
UTSA, supra note 3, § 1(4)(ii) at 542.
40. Von Kalinowski, supra note 37, at 599. Futurecraft, 205 Cal. App. at 288, 23 Cal.
Rptr. at 211. See also Rigging Int'l Maintenance Co. v. Gwin, 128 Cal. App. 3d 594, 607,
180 Cal. Rptr. 451, 458 (1982); Aetna Bldg. Co. v. West, 39 Cal. 2d 198, 206, 246 P.2d 11,
16 (1952).
41. See Von Kalinowski, supra note 37., at 583; Pavitt & Sokolski, Avoiding Misappro-
priation Claims, ATTORNEY'S GUIDE TO TRADE SECRETS § 5.18 (1971) (and cases cited
therein). See also Moss, Adams & Co. v. Shilling, 179 Cal. App. 3d 124, 129, 224 Cal. Rptr.
456, 459 (1986) (information that is easily obtainable through normal resources held not pro-
tectible as trade secret); American Paper, 183 Cal. App. 3d at 1326, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 718
(information generally known in trade and already used by good faith competitors is not a
trade secret); Fleming Sales Co., 611 F. Supp. at 514 (knowledge that any successful salesman
would necessarily acquire through experience amounts to general skills and knowledge
acquired in the course of employment, and as such is information an employee is free to take
and use in later pursuits). In Levine v. E.A. Johnson & Co., the court held that the defendant-
employee was free to use the knowledge and skill claimed by his employer to be a trade secret.
The court so held because of its determination that the ex-employee's knowledge and skill did
not originate with his former employer. Rather, the defendant had a "wealth of general expe-
rience which was the primary asset of the new concern and not the fruits of piracy of secret
information belonging to [his former employer.]" 107 Cal. App. 2d 322, 327, 237 P.2d 309,
312 (1951).
As the court in Fleming Sales Co. stated, any rule other than one which allows an
employee to take and use information comprised of general skills and knowledge acquired in
the course of employment "would force a departing employee to perform a prefrontal lobotomy
on himself or herself." 611 F. Supp. at 514.
42. Fleming Sales Co., 611 F. Supp. at 514.
43. Continental Car-Na-Var Corp. v. Moseley, 24 Cal. 2d 104, 110, 148 P.2d 9, 13
(1944); Cal Francisco Inv. Corp. v. Vrionis, 14 Cal. App. 3d 315, 323, 92 Cal. Rptr. 201, 205
(1971); Hollingsworth Solderless Terminal Co. v. Turley, 622 F.2d 1324, 1329 (9th Cir.
1980). Statutory support for this policy is found in California Business and Professions Code
section 16600, which states, "[e]xcept as provided in this chapter, every contract by which
anyone is restrained in a lawful profession is to that extent void." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §
16600 (West 1987). The statute invalidates agreements that penalize former employees for
obtaining employment with competitors but does not necessarily affect agreements which delin-
eate how the ex-employer can compete. Loral Corp., 174 Cal. App. 3d at 276, 219 Cal. Rptr.
at 841. Before invalidating a noninterference agreement, the potential impact on trade must be
considered. Id. at 278, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 843.
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the right to engage in a competitive business or to enter into competi-
tion with a former employer, provided that such competition is fairly
and legally conducted." This policy choice is, at least in part, prag-
matic. Courts cannot compel one who changes employers to "wipe
clean the slate of his memory."' 46 To do so would restrain that indi-
vidual from the pursuit of his profession, depriving him or her of the
use of knowledge and skills that did not originate with the former
employer." Consequently, California courts will enjoin this competi-
tion, or uphold contracts restraining such competition, only when a
former employee has unfairly used business secrets acquired from a
Judicial interpretation of this section has resulted in recognition of contracts which
attempt to restrain competition (and thereby inhibit the pursuit of a given calling, business or
profession) only where the ends are not unreasonable or arbitrary and unjustifiable, or where
the contract prohibits use of the employer's trade secrets. Sloan, supra note 27, at 130-31. See
also Moss, Adams & Co., 179 Cal. App. 3d at 130, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 715; Loral Corp., 174
Cal. App. 3d at 276, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 841; Gordon Termite Control v. Terrones, 84 Cal.
App. 3d 176, 178, 148 Cal. Rptr. 310, 311 (1978); Gordon, 49 Cal. 2d at 694, 321 P.2d at
459 (1958). Section 16600 represents such a strong public policy in California that when
California courts are confronted with a choice-of-law question concerning section 16600, no
agreement may be enforced that provides for application of the law of another state which is
contrary to that policy. Frame v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 20 Cal. App.
3d 668, 673, 97 Cal. Rptr. 811, 814 (1971).
44. Rigging Int'l Maintenance Co., 128 Cal. App. 3d at 606, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 457;
Continental Car-Na-Var Corp., 24 Cal. 2d at 110, 148 P.2d at 13; Cal Francisco Inv. Corp,
14 Cal. App. 3d at 323, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 206; Aetna, 39 Cal. 2d at 203, 246 P.2d at 14;
Southern Cal. Disinfecting Co. v. Lomkin, 183 Cal. App. 2d 431, 446, 7 Cal. Rptr. 43, 53
(1960). See also Moss, Adams & Co., 179 Cal. App. 3d at 130, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 459. As the
court in Rigging Int'l Maintenance Co. stated, "[ilf no confidential information is used, a
former employee is free to compete with his old employer, to advise customers of the old
employer of his new activities, and to solicit their business." 3d 128 Cal. App. at 612, 180 Cal.
Rptr. at 462 (quoting 7 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CAL. LAW, EQurrY § 87 (8th ed. 1974). It is
important to note, however, that although standards change along with public policy with
regard to business competition modified by social and economic conditions, deception has al-
ways been, and is now, recognized as unethical conduct. Southern Cal. Disinfecting Co., 183
Cal. App. 2d at 446, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 53.
45. Moss, Adams & Co., 179 Cal. App. 3d at 129, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 458; Futurecraft
Corp, 205 Cal. App. 2d at 288, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 210. See also Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. Audio
Devices, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 250, 266 (S.D. Cal. 1958), affd, 283 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 365 U.S. 869 (1961); Avocado Sales Co. v. Wyse, 122 Cal. App. 627, 634, 10
P.2d 485, 488 (1932).
46. Futurecraft, 205 Cal. App. at 288, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 210. See also Plant Indus., Inc.
v. Coleman, 287 F. Supp. 636, 640 (C.D. Cal. 1968). As the court in Winston Research Corp.
v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. reasoned:
IRiestrictions upon the use and disclosure of such information limit the em-
ployee's employment opportunities, tie him to a particular employer, and
weaken his bargaining power with that employer. Such restrictions interfere
with the employee's movement to the job in which he may most effectively use
his skills. . . . ITihey diminish potential competition . . . [and] impede the dis-
semination of ideas and skills throughout the industry.
350 F.2d 134, 137-38 (9th Cir. 1965).
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confidential employment relationship"' with a former employer.48
In determining whether information represents general knowl-
edge and skill of the trade or whether it can be protected as a trade
secret, courts will consider the length of an individual's employment
with a particular employer, as well as the number and nature of jobs
held by that individual prior to employment with that particular
employer.49 The characterization of information is perhaps most dif-
ficult to determine when an employee has acquired a special skill in
relation to a particular art, during involvement in a project utilizing
trade secrets to advance the state of the art."0 In such a case, the
likely determination is that the special skills and knowledge so
acquired by the employee will not be available for use by a subse-
quent employer, especially where it is apparent that the primary
reason for which the subsequent employer hired the former em-
47. For a discussion of the confidential relationship under the UTSA, see generally in-
fra notes 160-63 and accompanying text.
48. American Loan Corp. v. California Commercial Corp., 211 Cal. App. 2d 515, 522,
27 Cal. Rptr. 243, 247 (1963).
Thus, despite California Business and Professional Code § 16600, non-competition
clauses which protect an employer's trade secrets or confidential information will be enforced if
reasonable in scope. M. JAGER, supra note 3, § 13.01121. See also American Paper, 183 Cal.
App. 3d at 1322, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 715; Moss, Adams & Co., 179 Cal. App. 3d at 130, 224
Cal. Rptr. at 459; Loral, 174 Cal. App. 3d at 277, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 841; Muggill v. Reuben
H. Donnelly Corp., 62 Cal. 2d 239, 242, 398 P.2d 147, 149, 42 Cal. Rptr. 107, 109 (1965);
Gordon, 49 Cal. 2d at 694, 321 P.2d at 459.
49. Although the case did not turn on this distinction, the court in Futurecraft empha-
sized the importance of these factors. The defendant-employee, hired by Futurecraft for the
purpose of inventing, designing and developing valves and valve components for guided mis-
siles and rockets, had previously been employed by the California Institute of Technology at its
Jet Propulsion Laboratory on two separate occasions for a total of nearly four and one-half
years. When he began his employment at Futurecraft he brought with him knowledge con-
cerning the art, science and mechanics of valve design and manufacture, and skill in the
application of that knowledge. The trial court stated that "[mluch, probably most, of that
knowledge had been acquired at the ...California Institute of Technology. ... 205 Cal.
App. 2d at 282-83, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 206-07. The court held in favor of the defendant-em-
ployee so as not to restrain him in the pursuit of his profession or deprive him of the use of his
knowledge and skill that did not originate with Futurecraft. Id. at 288, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 210.
Conversely, in Rohm & Haas Co. v. Adco Chemical Co., the employment and educa-
tional history of plaintiff's ex-employee, Harvey, was a significant factor in the court's finding
of trade secrets instead of knowledge and skills-of the trade. The case involved a process used
in producing a latex paint vehicle (the liquid portion of paint). Harvey began his employment
with Rohm & Haas as a laboratory technician, and from the outset worked under Rohm &
Haas scientists in the development of latex paints, including those that incorporated the
claimed secret process. He was not a college graduate and had been unemployed for long
periods of time. Moreover, Rohm & Haas was the only company which had employed Harvey
to perform work relating to acrylic latexes. Thus, Harvey's knowledge was not attributable to
any other educational or work experience, and therefore was protectible as a trade secret. 689
F.2d 424, 427, 428 n.3 (3d Cir. 1982).
50. Pavitt and Sokolski, supra note 41, at § 5.21.
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ployee was to obtain a shortcut to the results attained by the former
employer.51
The line drawn by the courts in distinguishing information sub-
ject to protection as a trade secret from that which represents
intellectual tools of trade, which can be freely used by the employee,
reflects judicial balancing of several competing policy interests. Spe-
cifically, courts weigh the proprietary right of the employer to use
trade secrets in his or her business without' fear of disclosure 52
against the right of the former employee to pursue his or her chosen
lawful profession, trade or business.53 More generally, the courts
consider the right of the general public to have access to scientific
and academic innovativeness,' 4 freedom of contract55 and the mainte-
nance of ethical business practices.5"
In Moss, Adams & Co. v. Shilling,57 two professional employ-
ees of an accounting firm used a company card file to obtain
addresses of the firm's clients to whom they mailed announcements
of their newly formed accounting partnership. Both employees had
signed employment agreements58  stating that the names and ad-
dresses of Moss and Adams' clients were trade secrets and would not
be used to solicit those clients during their employment at the firm or
within one year thereafter. However, it was undisputed that the
51. Id.
52. Sloan, supra note 27, at 126. See, e.g., American Paper, 183 Cal. App. 3d at 1322,
228 Cal. Rptr. at 715. In general, the law of unfair competition prohibits former employees
from disclosing or misusing an employer's trade secrets and confidential information, even ab-
sent contractual restrictions. Loral, 174 Cal. App. 3d at 275, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 840 (citing
Empire Steam Laundry v. Lozier, 165 Cal. 95, 99, 130 P. 1180, 1182 (1913)). Confidentiality
agreements have thus been held not to constitute a restraint on trade. In addition, in states
where restrictive covenants are prohibited by law (see, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CoDE § 16600
(West 1987)), a covenant that restricts only the use of confidential information is enforceable.
M. JAGER, supra note 3, at § 13.01[1].
53. Sloan, supra note 27, at 120; Pavitt & Sokolski, supra note 41, at § 5.18. See, e.g.,
American Paper, 183 Cal. App. 3d at 1322, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 715. See also CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1987); Fleming Sales Co., 611 F. Supp. at 512.
54. Sloan, supra note 27, at 120. See also Fleming Sales Co., 611 F. Supp. at 514.
55. Von Kalinowski, supra note 37, at 583. But see CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600
(West 1987) (To the extent that a contract restrains an individual's pursuit of a lawful profes-
sion, trade or business, it is void.) See also supra note 43. See also CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 2870-
2872 (West Supp. 1987) (Any employment agreement which purports to assign to an em-
ployer an employee's invention which does not relate to the business of the employer and
which does not result from any work performed by the employee for the employer is unen-
forceable.); Cubic Corp., 185 Cal. App. 3d 438, 229 Cal. Rptr. 828.
56. Von Kalinowski, supra note 37, at 583.
57. 179 Cal. App. 3d 124, 224 Cal. Rptr. 456 (1986).
58. See id. at 127 n.I, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 457 n.1 for pertinent provisions of the employ-
ment agreement.
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employees used the card file only to obtain addresses of clients whose
names they already knew from having provided personal accounting
services to them during the preceding year. 9
The California Court of Appeal held that the names and
addresses of the Moss, Adams clients serviced by the two employees
during the year preceding their resignations were not trade secrets.
The court reasoned that because clients became known to the em-
ployees through personal contact and the providing of accounting
services, their names were not trade secrets." Furthermore, the ad-
dresses were not trade secrets because all of the clients were local,
and their addresses could have easily been obtained without use of
the card file, through normal resources such as telephone
directories.6
The Moss, Adams court held that employees cannot use trade
secrets to announce employment changes to their customers. How-
ever, since the names and addresses of the clients contacted in this
case were not trade secrets, the employees' use of the card file to
obtain the client addresses did not, as a matter of law, constitute
unfair competition." Moreover, because anti-solicitation covenants
are void as unlawful business restraints unless necessary for the pro-
tection of trade secrets, use of the card file was not actionable under
the employment agreements because the names and addresses ob-
tained from the file were not trade secrets.6" The court stated, "[t]he
applicable law in California is that the employer will be able to re-
strain by contract only that conduct of the former employee that
would have been subject to judicial restraint under the law of unfair
competition, absent the contract." '64
An action for trade secret misappropriation will thus lie only
where the facts demonstrate that the public policy in favor of pro-
tecting the employer's interest in maintaining the secret outweighs
the employee's interest in using his or her knowledge to support
59. Id. at 128, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 458.
60. Id. at 129, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 459. The court noted that the names of other Moss,
Adams clients may have remained trade secrets, but those names and addresses were not re-
corded by the employees, nor were announcements mailed to them. Id.
61. Id. at 129-30, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 459. The court observed that at most, use of the
card file saved the employees from the "minor inconvenience" of obtaining the desired ad-
dresses through generally available resources. Id. at 130, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 459.
62. Id. at 130, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 459.
63. Id. see CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600. See also supra note 43 for a discussion
of section 16600.
64. Moss, Adams & Co., 179 Cal. App. 3d at 130, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 459 (quoting
Hays, The California Law of Unfair Competition Takes a Turn - Against the Employer, 41
CALIF. L. REV. 38, 69 (1953)).
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himself or herself in other employment. 6 The aim in providing pro-
tection in such cases is to encourage innovation. Otherwise, no em-
ployer would be willing to invest large sums of money in the re-
search and development of new ideas, processes or methods if others
were free to take and use the same with impunity.66 Consequently,
when information is developed as the result of an employer's initia-
tive and investment, and is entrusted to an employee in confidence,
restrictions upon an employee's disclosure of the information are
necessary to maintain both the vitality of employer-employee rela-
tionships and the necessary level of communication among employ-
ees, which might otherwise be restricted."'
B. Establishing ihe Existence of a Trade Secret
In the context of trade secret litigation, proof of the existence of
a trade secret has been characterized as the "sin qua non" of a mis-
appropriation claim.66 Whether or not a trade secret exists is gener-
ally regarded as a question of fact69 which must be proven by the
alleged owner.70 This burden can present particular problems for an
employer who has not adequately defined his or her trade secrets in
an employment or nondisclosure agreement, for there exists no sin-
gle, uniform definition upon which a trade secret owner can rely to
prove the existenice of a particular trade secret. Moreover, although
an employer can base a misappropriation claim upon an implied
covenant of nondisclosure, such a covenant operates only to proscribe
the unauthorized use of trade secret information by a former em-
ployee. It does not specifically describe the information considered
by the employer to be a trade secret. 1
65. Diodes, Inc. v. Franzen, 260 Cal. App. 2d 244, 250, 67 Cal. Rptr. 19, 22 (1968).
66. Von Kalinowski, supra note 37, at 589.
67. Winston, 350 F.2d at 138; By-Buk Co, 163 Cal. App. 2d at 165, 329 P.2d at 151.
68. M. JAGER, supra note 3, at § 5.02.
69. Id. at § 5.01; Moss, Adams & Co., 179 Cal. App. 3d at 128, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 458.
70. M. JAGER, supra note 3, at § 5.02.
71. It is unlikely that an employee ignorant of the trade secret nature of the information
will be held liable for the wrongful post-employment use of such information. Thus, in the
absence of an express covenant which specifies the trade secret nature of the information in
question, to establish a case for trade secret misappropriation based upon an implied covenant
of non-disclosure, an employer will have to rely upon: (1) the context of the disclosure to the
employee; (2) the protective measures undertaken by the employer to insure the secret status of
the information; or (3) the employee's reasonably expected possession of knowledge that his or
her employer's commercial advantage over competitors is the result of the trade secret in ques-
tion. Gilburne and Johnston, Trade Secret Protection for Software Generally and in the Mass
Market, 3 COMPUTER L.J. 211, 240 (1982). See also I R. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE
SECRETS § 5.02(2) (1987) (Rel. 22-8/86).
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1. The Absence of a Uniform Definition
The term "trade secret" has been described as "one of the most
elusive and difficult concepts in law to define."7 This difficulty is
not surprising considering that the same information that qualifies as
a trade secret under one set of facts may not be afforded protection
under a different set of facts.7 Factors that have been considered
significant in determining whether information is a trade secret are
the extent to which the information is known outside of the business,
the extent of measures undertaken to 'guard the secrecy of the infor-
mation, the value of the information to its owner and to his or her
competitors, the amount of effort or money expended by the owner
in developing the information, and the ease or difficulty with which
the information could be properly acquired or duplicated7 by
others. 5 Despite the availability of such objective criteria, there ex-
ists no universally recognized definition of "trade secret."'77 How-
ever, steps have been taken in that direction with the approval and
limited adoption of the UTSA.
2. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act"8
The UTSA was promulgated in 1979 in response to the unsat-
isfactory development of state trade secret law. 7" The development of
trade secret law had been uneven, due at least in part to the differ-
72. See M. JAGER, supra note 3, at § 5.01 (quoting Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Ark-Ell
Springs, Inc., 569 F.2d 286, 288 (5th Cir. 1978)); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757,
comment b (1939). See also Futurecraft, 205 Cal. App. 2d at 289, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 211.
73. Customer lists are a good example. A set of names, not readily ascertainable by
others in the industry, compiled by an employer through a sophisticated, difficult and time-
consuming process, in an industry characterized by customer loyalty, and given by that em-
ployer to his employees, will very likely qualify as a trade secret. Conversely, that same set of
names, if readily ascertainable by competitors, derived from a relatively brief, non-sophisti-
cated compilation process, and resulting from the employee's effort, in an industry in which
success depends on the price and quality of the product or service rather than customer loyalty,
will probably not qualify for trade secret protection. See American Paper, 183 Cal. App. 3d
318, 228 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1986).
74. Matters completely disclosed by the goods which one markets cannot be trade
secrets. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757, comment b (1939). See also Futurecraft,
205 Cal. App. 2d at 289, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 211.
75. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 comment b; see also Futurecraft, 205 Cal.
App. 2d at 289, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 211.
76. M. JAGER, supra note 3, at § 5.05.
77. UTSA, supra note 3, at 537. See supra note 25 for a list of states that have adopted
the UTSA. Although broad in scope, the UTSA is not intended to be an exclusive remedy.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 3426.7 (West Supp. 1987). See also Better Protection, supra note 1, at 53.
78. UTSA, supra note 3.
79. UTSA, supra note 3, at 537.
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ence in the number of reported decisions in states that are commer-
cial centers and those that are more agricultural.8 In addition, con-
siderable uncertainty existed regarding the boundaries of trade secret
protection and the appropriate remedies for trade secret misappro-
priation. 1 Thus, the UTSA was proposed to help remedy this con-
fusion as well as to establish some common rules for trade secret
disputes in an effort to provide some uniformity among
jurisdictions. 2
The UTSA became effective in California 3 with slight modifi-
cations84 on January 1, 1985. It codifies the basic principles of
common law trade secret protection and, like traditional trade secret
law, contains general concepts.85 One of the most significant contri-
butions 6 of the UTSA, however, is its substitution of a unitary defi-
nition of "trade secret"87 for the oft-cited Restatement (First) of
Torts definition of "trade secret."8" The UTSA 9 defines "trade se-
cret" as follows:
"Trade secret" means information, including a formula, pat-
tern, compilation,90 program, device, method, technique, or
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Better Protection, supra note 1, at 51,68; UTSA, supra note 3, at 538; American
Paper, 183 Cal. App. 3d at 1324, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
83. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 3426-3426.10 (West Supp. 1987).
84. See infra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
85. UTSA, supra note 3, at 538.
86. The provisions of the UTSA that distinguish it from traditional trade secret law are
unitary definitions of "trade secret" and trade secret "misappropriation," a single statute of
limitations for property, quasi-contractual, and breach of fiduciary relationship theories of
noncontractual liability. In addition, the UTSA codifies the results of the better reasoned cases
regarding remedies for trade secret misappropriation. See UTSA, supra note 3, at §§ 1(2),
1(4), 2, 3, 6.
87. UTSA, supra note 3, at 538.
88. A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of
information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportu-
nity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it. It may
be a formula for a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or
preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or other device, or a list of cus-
tomers .... A trade secret is a process or device for continuous use in the
operation of business.
RESTATEMENr (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757, comment b (1939). By-Buk Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d at
166, 329 P.2d at 152; Futurecraf, 205 Cal. App. 2d at 289, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 211; Sinclair, 42
Cal. App. 3d at 221, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 658; Cal Francisco Inv. Corp, 14 Cal. App. 3d at 322,
92 Cal. Rptr. at 204.
89. Unless otherwise noted, all subsequent references to the UTSA will be to the act as
embodied in CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3426-3426.10 (West Supp. 1987).
90. A "compilation" of data can be produced from any source, and need not be docu-
ments. Moreover, such a compilation can be as readily stored in one's memory as in some
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process, that: (1) Derives independent economic value, actual or
potential, from not being generally known to the public or to
other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure
or use;9 and (2) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable
under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. 9'
In comparison to the Restatement definition, which requires
that a trade secret be "continuously used in one's business," the
broader definition in the UTSA extends protection to a plaintiff who
has yet to acquire the opportunity or means with which to put a
trade secret to use.9" Implied protection is extended to "know-how,"
the collection of data collateral to the primary trade secret.94 Fur-
thermore, negative information, whose commercial value stems from
lengthy and excessive research which proves that a certain process
will not work, is also protected."
The language "not being generally known to the public or to
other persons" does not require that the information be generally
known to the public in order for trade secret rights to be lost. 6
written form. American Paper, 183 Cal. App. 3d at 1324, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
91. The language in this section of California's UTSA represents a modification of that
proposed by section 1(4)(i) of the UTSA, which requires the value of information be derived
"from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by,
another person who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use." CAL. CIV. CODE §
3426.1(d)(1) (West Supp. 1987) In comparison, California's version of the Act reads "from not
.being generally known to the public or to other persons who can obtain economic value from
its disclosure or use." Id. (emphasis added).
Omitted from the statute is the requirement that the plaintiff prove that the information is
not "readily ascertainable." See UTSA, supra note 3, at § 1(4)(1). However, new language
was inserted into the official comments to clarify the Legislature's position that the "readily
ascertainable" standard is still available as an affirmative defense. Senate Comment, supra
note 5. The issue is merely one of burden of proof; the defendant must carry that burden
under California's version of the UTSA. Pooley, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act: Cal. Civ.
Code § 3426 [hereinafter Pooley UTSAJ; SANrA CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 193
(1985).
92. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d)(2) (West Supp. 1987) (emphasis added). Note that
this definition does represent a modification of the definition contained in the original version
of the Act. See supra note 91.
93. It does not appear that the recognized distinction applied to concepts or abstractions
which have been held not to be trade secrets was intended to be abandoned. Under prior
California law, "ideas" of speculative potential value could serve as the basis for a claim only
when accompanied by an express or implied obligation to hold the idea in confidence. How-
ever, the statutory recognition of "potentially useful" inventions as trade secrets apparently
negates the argument that the inventions of an employee, produced on the employer's behalf,
are less deserving of protection than the existing trade secrets of an employer disclosed to an
employee. Pooley UTSA, supra note 91, at 195-200.
94. Better Protection, supra note 1, at 51; Senate Comment, supra note 5.
95. Senate Comment, supra note 5.
96. UTSA, supra note 3, at 542 (Commissioner's Comment); Senate Comment, supra
note 5. See also American Paper, 183 Cal. App. 3d at 1326-27, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
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There is no trade secret if someone who can obtain economic benefit
from the information can procure the information lawfully."' Like-
wise, if an individual reveals a trade secret to others who are under
no obligation to protect the confidentiality of the information, or oth-
erwise makes a public disclosure of the secret, that person's property
right in the trade secret vanishes."8
To insure that information purported to be "not generally
known" does not become generally known and thereby fail to be sub-
ject to protection as a trade secret, the UTSA definition of "trade
secret" requires that the information be the subject of "efforts that
are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy." ' 9
Absolute secrecy is not required. 00 Instead, the degree of confidenti-
ality required is that which would enable a court acting in equity to
enforce a plaintiffis rights.' 0' Thus, "the employer must come into
court with clean hands . . . [and] cannot complain of the employee's
use of the information if the employer has never treated the informa-
tion as secret.' 02
Reasonable use of a trade secret, such as controlled disclosure to
employees and licensees, is consistent with the requirement of
97. UTSA, supra note 3, at 542 (Commissioner's Comment); Senate Comment, supra
note 5. See also American Paper, 183 Cal. App. 3d at 1326-27, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 718. The
California act specifically excepts "reverse engineering" from the definition of acquisition by
"improper means." CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(a) (West Supp. 1987). A trade secret is reverse
engineered by "taking apart and examining the publicly available product in order to under-
stand the secret." Also not considered "improper" acquisition is the acquisition of information
"readily available" to the public or other competitors through public literature, visual inspec-
tion, or relatively uncomplicated reverse engineering methods. Pooley, supra note 1, at 52.
Assertion of discovery through such proper means is available as a defense to a claim of misap-
propriation. Senate Comment, supra note 5. See also POOLEY TRADE SECRETS, supra note 3.
98. Jostens, 318 N.W.2d at 700.
99. Electro-Craft, 332 N.W.2d at 901; Surgidev Corp., 648 F. Supp. at 693. As a gen-
eral rule, the amount of protective efforts required for trade secret status to apply increases
with the importance and sensitivity of the information. POOLEY TRADE SECRETS, supra note
3, at 20.
100. CAL.. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d)(2) (West Supp. 1987). The courts do not require
unduly expensive procedures to protect the secrecy of such information. Among efforts which
have been held to be reasonable are advising employees of the existence of a trade secret,
limiting access to trade secrets on a "need to know" basis, and controlling plant access. Con-
versely, protection can be precluded by public disclosure of information through display, trade
journal publications, advertising, or other carelessness. UTSA, supra note 3, at 542 (Commis-
sioner's Comment); Senate Comment, supra note 5.
101. Electro-Craft Corp., 332 N.W.2d at 901.
102. Id. This requirement of secrecy is the aspect of trade secret law which truly distin-
guishes it from other means of protecting information, such as patents and employment con-
tracts containing a non-competition clause. The latter two forms of protection depend on a
single act by the employer. Conversely, trade secret protection depends upon an employer's
continuing course of conduct that creates a confidential relationship. Id.
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relative secrecy.' However, the UTSA implies that a mere showing
that the information is so inherently valuable that the defendant
should have known it was to be protected will not satisfy the re-
quirement of relative secrecy.'0 4 The owner should at least be ex-
pected to demonstrate that sensitive data. has been identified and
guidance offered regarding its use to employees, vendors and others
who may have access to the confidential information. 0 The infor-
mation must, however, be secret from the outset. No degree of effort
to preserve the confidentiality of information will suffice if the infor-
mation is "readily ascertainable by proper means."106
Because trade secrets lie somewhere on a continuum from data
generally known in an industry to data with some degree of unique-
ness, identification of information as a trade secret is necessary to
alleviate the confusion that frequently surrounds the status of such
information." In order for information to qualify as a trade secret,
a certain amount of innovation is required. 0 8 Mere variations which
embody no superior advances in general processes known in an in-
dustry or trade are not protected. 0 9 However, modifications or im-
provements in such a process which render it unique in the industry,
as well as unique combinations of generally known elements, " 0 may
103. UTSA, supra note 3, at 542 (Commissioner's Comment); Senate Comment, supra
note 5.
104. Better Protection, supra note 1, at 51.
105. Id. However, the absence of specific confidentiality procedures may not by itself
negate the existence of "reasonable" efforts to maintain secrecy. The nature of the organization
or business wherein trade secrets are used should be considered. In Fleming Sales Co., Inc. v.
Bailey, account lists were provided to Fleming's principals, and there existed no written policy
or clearly articulated procedures to ensure the confidentiality of the customer lists. The court
pointed out, however, that the customer lists were being used in a sales organization where
constant communication with customers was the essence of the business. Consequently,
Fleming's principals and the employees who maintained that contact needed ready access to
customer information. The court held that so long as distribution of customer list information
was strictly limited to employees and outsiders whose access was necessary to the business, the
"reasonable efforts" requirement would be satisfied, particularly if those given access to the
information were advised to preserve its confidentiality. 611 F. Supp. 507, 512 (D.C. Ill. 1985)
(applying the UTSA as adopted in Indiana).
106. Fleming Sales Co., 611 F. Supp. at 513.
107. Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 476. See alsoJostens, 318 N.W.2d at 698; Surgidev Corp.,
648 F. Supp. at 688.
108. Surgidev, 648 F. Supp. at 668;Jostens, 318 N.W.2d at 698; Koehring Co. v. E.D.
Etnyre & Co., 254 F. Supp. 344, 361 (N.D. Ill. 1966).
109. Jostens, 318 N.W.2d at 698; American Chain and Cable Co. v. Avery, 143 U.S.
Pat. Q. 126, 130. See also Electro-Craft, 332 N.W.2d at 899; Aetna, 39 Cal. 2d at 205-06,
246 P.2d at 16.
110. See Electro-Craft, 332 N.W.2d at 899.
In Plant Industries v. Coleman, plaintiff's claimed trade secrets involved formulas for
processing citrus peel, which included proportions of the materials used and time for cooking.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
qualify as trade secrets. 11 The language of the UTSA defining
"trade secret" is not exclusive. The failure of the drafters to include
a particular form of information in the definition does not represent
an intent to exclude the same."' The UTSA merely provides a uni-
form definition of the type of information that can be protected as a
trade secret.1 8 It does not specifically identify information that is a
"trade secret." Identification of individual trade secrets requires spe-
cific definition of those trade secrets. Employer-owners of trade
secrets must, therefore, sufficiently define their trade secrets to insure
adequate protection under the Act.
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF A SUFFICIENTLY PARTICULAR
DEFINITION
Whether the definition of a particular trade secret is specific
enough to identify the information which constitutes the trade secret,
and thereby place others on notice of its status, depends upon the
facts and circumstances present in each case.11 When an employer
fails to adequately define or identify his or her trade secret, a num-
ber of problems may arise. First, without a sufficiently particular
definition, the existence and scope of the claimed trade secret, actual
or potential, may be unknown. Consequently, an employee might
use or disclose information which, unknown to him or her, is in fact
confidential.11 ' Moreover, in the absence of a definition that clearly
identifies the alleged trade secret, a court may be unable to devise a
fair and meaningful injunction preventing its dissemination.11
A second problem presented by an employer's inadequate defi-
nition is that a lack of specificity may be judicially interpreted as a
failure to take reasonable steps required by the UTSA to insure the
secrecy of the information. 1 Thus, an employer's lack of specificity
Although plaintiff's approach to processing involved general concepts which were not trade
secrets, the particular manner and means for employing those concepts in certain phases of the
process were found by the court to constitute trade secrets. 287 F. Supp. 636, 642 (S.D. Cal.
1968).
111. Jostens, 318 N.W.2d at 698-99. For example, in Sinclair, a portable device used to
convert brain waves into audible form was found to be a mechanical improvement over the
previous stationary equipment, and was therefore found to be a trade secret. 42 Cal. App. at
221, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 658.
112. American Paper, 138 Cal. App. 3d at 1323-24, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 716 (citing the
following language of the act: "[ilnformation including a formula. (emphasis added)).
113. See id. at 1324, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
114. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
115. See generally supra note 6.
116. See Electro-Craft, 332 N.W.2d at 898.
117. See generally infra notes 145-57.
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may be viewed as evidence of his or her failure to convey to
employees the confidential nature of the information or to identify
information considered confidential.
Employee mobility can likewise present problems when trade
secrets are not adequately defined. Because trade secrets need not be
exclusive so long as they are not generally known, independent de-
velopers can acquire rights in the same trade secret. " 8 Thus, if two
employers have rights in the same trade secret, and an employee of
Employer A goes to work for Employer B, in order for B to avoid a
misappropriation claim by A, B should define and record a specific
definition of the trade secret. This will help B prove that she did not
wrongfully acquire information concerning that trade secret from A's
former employee.
The failure to clearly define a trade secret could be fatal to a
claim for misappropriation." Without a proven trade secret, there
can be no claim for misappropriation, 2 ' even if an employee's ac-
tions were wrongful. 21 Were this not the case, courts would "come
dangerously close to expanding the trade secrets act into a catchall
for industrial torts."' 22 It is important to note, however, that an
agreement defining a trade secret may not be decisive in determining
whether a court will regard it as such. 2
IV. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION1 24
A. The Existence of a Trade Secret
1. Specific Definition
A successful claim under the UTSA for misappropriation by
wrongful use or disclosure of information requires that the plaintiff-
employer demonstrate that the defendant-employee knew or had
118. Senate Comment, supra note 5. See, e.g., Surgidev, 648 F. Supp. at 688-89. Ac-
cord Electro-Craft, 332 N.W.2d at 900. If a valuable share of the market would be obtained
by an outsider given access to certain information, then that information may be a trade secret
if it is not known or readily ascertainable. Id.
119. See infra notes 134-42 and accompanying text.
120. See Fleming Sales Co., 611 F. Supp. at 511 (In the absence of a restrictive cove-
nant, information that does not qualify as a trade secret under the UTSA cannot be the subject
of an action for misappropriation.).
121. Electro-Craft, 332 N.W.2d at 897 n.5;Jostens, 318 N.W.2d at 701.
122. Electro-Craft, 332 N.W.2d at 897 (disagreeing with the holding in Goldberg v.
Medtronic, Inc., 686 F.2d 1219 (7th Cir. 1982)).
123. American Paper, 183 Cal. App. 3d at 1325, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
124. In light of the relatively short period of time that has elapsed since California's
adoption of the UTSA, this analysis will focus primarily on the leading cases from Minnesota,
whose adoption of the act predates that of California.
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reason to know, at the time of use or disclosure, that his or her
knowledge of the trade secret was acquired under circumstances giv-
ing rise to a duty to maintain secrecy or to limit its use.125 The em-
ployer must, therefore, adequately identify the information that is to
be kept secret so that the employee will have some reason to know
exactly what information he or she is not to disclose. 2
As an illustration, the Minnesota Supreme Court, interpreting
the UTSA in Jostens, Inc. v. National Computer Systems, 2" found
that the elasticity of the plaintiff-employer's claim of a trade secret
rendered it insufficient to establish a trade secret. 28 Jostens brought
suit against several of its former employees, as well as the computer
firm which subsequently employed them, for misappropriation of
trade secrets and proprietary data in Jostens' computer system.' 29
Although the components of the system were purchased from outside
vendors, Jostens claimed that its "customization" of those compo-
nents was necessary to form a productive system, and therefore
constituted a trade secret.' The court rejected the claim, which at
times appeared to include the entire computer system, and at other
times, something less, stating that "simply to assert [that] a trade
secret resides in some combination of otherwise known data is not
sufficient, as the combination itself must be delineated with some
particularity in establishing its trade secret status. "131
Similarly, in Motorola, Inc. v. Fairchild Camera & Instru-
ment Corp., 82  the employee-defendant had entered into an
agreement with Motorola regarding disclosure of trade secrets.' 3
The employees were not advised upon execution of the agreement, or
125. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(b)(2)(B)(ii) (West Supp. 1987).
126. It is important to note, however, that as a matter of law, private parties are unable
to claim or stipulate by contract that something is a trade secret when in fact it is not. Better
Protection, supra note 1, at 53. See also supra note 120 and accompanying text.
127. 318 N.W.2d 691 (Minn. 1982).
128. Id. at 699.
129. Id. at 697.
130. Id. at 699.
131. Id.
132. 366 F. Supp. 1173 (D. Ariz. 1973).
133. The agreement provided in pertinent part as follows:
2. That I will maintain strictly confidential during any employment all data and
information of the company which I may originate or of which I learn during
my employment . . . which is of confidential or secret nature such as product,
machine, and process developments . . . manufacturing "know-how" and speci-
fications . . . and upon termination of my employment, . . . I will not take
with me or remove documentary material of the company on such date and
information, or any record or copy thereof.
Id. at 1183.
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at any time thereafter, about what information, if any, Motorola
considered proprietary."' 4 Furthermore, Motorola's records, as well
as those of their "learned patent counsel" who was privy to the al-
leged trade secret information, were devoid of a list or index of any
kind that documented information considered by Motorola to be
trade secrets.'" 5 Based on these facts, the vague agreement was held
to be unenforceable"3 6 under California law.1"' The court empha-
sized that trade secret production "is not a sword to be used by em-
ployers to retain employees by the threat of rendering them substan-
tially unemployable in the field of their experience should they
desire to resign."' 3 8
Lack of clarity was likewise fatal to the plaintiff-employer's
trade secret claim in Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion,
Inc., '3 which is another Minnesota Supreme Court case interpreting
the UTSA. Electro-Craft Corporation (ECC) claimed that Con-
trolled Motion, Inc. (CMI) and CMI's president, a former employee
of ECC, improperly copied the design of several ECC's electric mo-
tors.' 4 ECC's failure to introduce into evidence the dimensions, tol-
erances, and other related features of the brushless motor precluded
a showing that certain features of the brushless motor could be pro-
tected as trade secrets.' 4 ' ECC's lack of specificity also made impos-
sible the formulation of a meaningful injunction which would not
unduly restrict competition. 42
In comparison, the court found ECC's description of the specific
combination of dimensions, tolerances, adhesives and manufacturing
processes for the moving coil motors to be sufficiently detailed to es-
tablish trade secrets and thus support a claim for misappropria-
tion. 43 However, because ECC neglected to undertake reasonable
134. Id. at 1185. Motorola failed to identify any secret information upon the employees'
termination despite the fact that Motorola knew at the time that the employees planned to
work for a competitor. Id.
135. Id. The court noted the demonstrated fact that in other similar companies in the
same industry, such restrictive agreements were implemented at the time of employment by
furnishing employees with a list of secrets claimed by the employer. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1183.
138. Id. at 1186 (quoting E.W. Bliss Co. v. Struthers-Dunn, Inc., 408 F.2d 1108, 1112-
13 (8th Cir. 1969)).
139. 332 N.W.2d 890 (Minn. 1983).
140. ECC claimed misappropriation of trade secrets with respect to one moving coil
motor and one brushless motor. Id. at 893.
141. Id. at 898.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 899.
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efforts to maintain the secrecy of that information, its claim for mis-
appropriation of those trade secrets failed.144
2. Reasonable Efforts to Maintain Secrecy
Although maintenance of absolute secrecy is not required, an
employer must be able to establish that his or her treatment of the
information in question has been adequate to place employees on
notice of their duty of confidentiality with regard to that informa-
tion.146 Simply prohibiting employees from using or disclosing
"secrets" does not create such a duty. 1H Thus, in Electro-Craft,
ECC's failure to establish measures which would have given rise to
such a duty in its employees rendered its "confidentiality"'' 47 proce-
dures 48 "fatally lax," especially in light of the demonstrated
frequency with which employees in that industry changed
employers. '49
ECC's procedures were found to be particularly inadequate due
to the nonintuitive nature of its claimed trade secrets.' 50 ECC should
have informed its employees, in no uncertain terms, that the features
were secret. Instead, ECC treated the information as non-secret.' 5'
Technical documents were not marked "Confidential"; drawings,
dimensions and parts were sent to customers and vendors without
special marking; employee access to documents was unrestricted.
ECC never issued a policy statement outlining what it considered to
be secret.' 52 Moreover, ECC's claimed "intention" to keep its data
144. Id. at 901.
145. See supra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
146. Electro-Craft, 332 N.W.2d at 901-03.
147. The court referred to "confidentiality" as the procedure by which the employer
signals to its employees and to others that certain information is secret and therefore should
not be disclosed. Id. at 902.
148. The insufficient, minimal precautions taken by ECC consisted of screening its
handbook and publications for confidential information and requiring some employees to sign a
confidentiality agreement. See infra note 154; id. at 901-02.
149. The court found that the frequency with which employees in the servomotor busi-
ness left their employers in order to produce similar or identical devices was not unknown. In
fact, ECC had itself hired many employees from other corporations manufacturing similar
products. Consequently, ECC had an obligation to inform its employees that certain informa-
tion was secret so as to prevent them from making similar moves. Id. at 902.
150. The court observed that the dimensions, tolerances, and other related features of
ECC's motors were not trade secrets in an obvious way as a "secret formula" might be. Id. at
902. For example, where a specialty cookie shop is successful because of its "secret recipe," the
employees will likely be aware of the confidential nature of that recipe. Id.
151. Id. at 902-03.
152. In addition, vendors and customers were permitted to informally tour the plants
without warnings regarding confidential information. In fact, an "open house" was conducted
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and processes secret was found by the court to be irrelevant with
regard to the statutory requirement that ECC use "efforts that are
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain . . . secrecy." ' 3
Although the employees signed confidentiality agreements, the
court found the agreements to be too vague to apprise the employees
of specific secrets.""' Similarly, the exit interviews, which were little
more than attempts to intimidate employees to prevent them from
leaving ECC and engaging in legitimate competition, were not found
to constitute reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy. 5 Thus, because
the evidence introduced by ECC did not demonstrate consistent ef-
forts to maintain secrecy, ECC failed to establish the existence of
any trade secrets' " and was thereby precluded from making a claim
for misappropriation. ""
It is important to keep in mind, however, that since the concepts
of trade secret status and misappropriation are so interrelated, they
should not be artificially separated in analyzing misappropriation
claims. Thus, the alleged confidential relationships which give rise to
the duty not to misappropriate must be likewise examined."
B. The Confidential Relationship
Although a common law duty of confidentiality arises out of the
employer-employee relationship, employees must treat as secret only
information which employers have treated as secret. 5 In order for
employers to impose such a duty on employees with regard to
specific information, employers must define that information with
particularity sufficient to indicate to employees that the information
is confidential. Employees are entitled to fair notice of both the confi-
dential relationship and the identity of the material to be kept confi-
dential.' 60 Thus, in Electro-Craft, because the information referred
to in the employee agreements was only vaguely described as "se-
at two different plants wherein the public was invited to observe manufacturing processes. Id.
at 903.
153. Id. at 901.
154. Id. at 903. The agreements were part of the employment agreements, which readin part as follows: "FOURTH - Employee shall not directly or indirectly disclose or use at
any time, either during or subsequent to the said employment, any secret or confidential infor-
mation, knowledge or data of Employer . (emphasis added). Id. at 895 n.I.
155. Id. at 895.
156. Id. at 903.
157. Id. at 897.
158. Id. at 903.
159. Id. See also Jostens, 318 N.W.2d at 702.
160. Electro-Craft, 332 N.W.2d at 903; Jostens, 318 N.W.2d at 702.
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cret," the employees were never placed on notice of any duty of con-
fidentiality. As a result of this failure by ECC to adequately convey
to its employees the scope of the information, no duty of confidential-
ity was created, and therefore no misappropriation could have
occurred.1"1
V. PROPOSAL
A. A Specifically Defined Trade Secret
The potential problems inherent in an insufficiently defined
trade secret are thus numerous and often irreversible. To insure pro-
tection it is therefore essential that an employer follow the two-step
procedure of: (1) defining his or her proprietary information; and (2)
confidentially imparting a specific definition of that information to
employees whose assistance is vital to its valuable use. 62 Execution
of this two-step procedure should achieve two goals: (1) employees
will be on notice of the existence and scope of the trade secret; and
(2) a duty of confidentiality in the employees will be created by vir-
tue of the employer's effort to convey the confidentiality of the
information in question." In addition, the UTSA requirement of('reasonable efforts" to maintain the secrecy of the information
should be satisfied.1
64
By specifically defining trade secrets at the outset of an individ-
ual's employment, an employer will immediately remove any doubt
from the mind of the employee as to what information is to be kept
secret. The employer may be able to avoid costly litigation that may
later develop should that employee leave, unaware of the scope of
information that is not to be used or disclosed.
161. See Electro-Craft, 332 N.W.2d at 897.
162. See generally supra notes 126-38 and accompanying text.
Disclosure of such a specific definition should not be made to employees who have no
contact with the information or whose limited contact with that information is such that disclo-
sure of a specific definition would impart knowledge not previously known. Disclosure to such
employees could ironically be interpreted as a failure to maintain secrecy. This is not to say
that such employees should not be informed of their duty not to use or disclose their employer's
trade secrets. The point is, rather, that the lack of, or limited nature of, their contact with the
trade secret neither necessitates nor warrants disclosure of such a specific definition.
163. Electro-Craft, 332 N.W.2d at 903. See also Jostens, 318 N.W.2d at 702 (Due to
plaintiff-Jostens' failure to take reasonable precautions to protect information that it claimed at
trial to be secret, the defendant-employees could not have been expected to know what was
confidential and what was not.); Motorola, 366 F. Supp. at 1186 (The court held that plain-
tiff's trade secret claims necessarily failed because no real effort was made by plaintiff to keep
the information secret).
164. See generally supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
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In the event that litigation does ensue, however, evidence of the
employer's definition should constitute evidence of the employer's ef-
forts to maintain secrecy and, if the information is otherwise subject
to protection, should enable a court to find the existence of a trade
secret. In addition, presented with evidence of the specific definition,
a court should be able to more readily ascertain the scope of discov-
ery and, if necessary, formulate an appropriate injunction. 65
B. Approach
The real utility of an employer's specific definition of confiden-
tial information arises from the communication of that definition to
employees whose assistance is necessary for its valuable use. This
communication is especially critical when employee mobility is com-
monplace or where the nature of the claimed trade secret is not obvi-
ous or intuitive. Two possible methods for implementing this com-
munication are: (1) Employee agreements containing covenants that
prohibit disclosure, use, and/or competition regarding the informa-
tion specifically articulated; and (2) A written definition of trade
secrets presented to employees exposed to it and then safely secured
in a place with restricted access.'
1. Methods of Communicating Trade Secret Definitions
a. Employee Agreements
In the absence of contractual restrictions, the law of unfair com-
petition prohibits former employees from disclosing or misusing a
former employer's trade secrets.16 7 However to insure protection of a
trade secret, an express contract'68 is preferred over any contract that
may be implied in law." 9 Such an agreement clearly and unequivo-
165. By defining the "metes and bounds" of trade secrets, a plaintiff can speed up dis-
covery, effectively circumscribing the limits of the defendant's discovery since the defendant is
normally not permitted to substantially broaden the scope of the inquiry initiated by the plain-
tiff. SEIDEL, WHAT THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER SHOULD KNOW ABOUT TRADE SECRETS
AND EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENTS 129 (2d ed. 1984).
166. See supra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
167. 1 R. MILGRIM, MILIGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 6.01 (1987) (Rel. 21-12/85).
168. Loral Corp., 174 Cal. App. 3d at 275, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 840; Empire Steam
Laundry v. Lozier, 165 Cal. 95, 99, 130 P. 1180, 1182 (1913).
169. Although contracts that preclude a former employee from obtaining new
employment with a competitor are invalid under section 16600 of the California Business and
Professions Code (see supra note 43), contracts that are necessary to protect the employer's
trade secrets have been upheld. Thus, contracts that contain reasonably limited restrictions
which are more likely to promote than restrain trade and business do not violate the statute,
nor do employee agreements not to disclose the trade secrets of a former employer. Loral
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cally puts an employee on notice of the employer's trade secret claim,
making the employee "secrecy" conscious, and theoretically encour-
ages prudent conduct with regard to the confidential information.
170
The confidential status of the information is thus clearly established
by the agreement. 7 Moreover, in the context of litigation, a written
agreement is proof that the employer considers the secret important
and has taken definite action to prevent its unauthorized use and
disclosure. It is important to recognize, however, that an employer
may not protect information as a trade secret simply by labeling it a
trade secret in such an agreement, when in fact it may not merit
such protection.'7 2 Thus, matters generally known in a trade or
readily available to those in the trade cannot be made secret by label-
ing them as such in an agreement.7
8
Assuming that the defined trade secret is sufficiently specific,
one risk in relying upon such an agreement for protection is that the
language of the agreement may be too broad. In such a case, the
contract may be deemed unenforceable as a restraint on employee
mobility. 17 4 Conversely, the language of the agreement may be too
narrow to protect the incidental or collateral phases of the process
which were not carefully articulated in the agreement. Thus, the
language of such an agreement must be carefully drafted so as not to
be too broad or too narrow.
Another drawback of the written agreement is the possible
negative impact on employee relations. The request to sign such a
contract may be construed by long-time, loyal employees as an insult
to their integrity. To reduce the possibility of misunderstanding,
these employees should be.provided with an explanation of both the
purpose of agreements and the role that individual adherence to the
contracts plays in protecting the employer's trade secret.' 71 There is
also the danger that secrecy agreements may instill larcenous thought
Corp., 174 Cal. App. 3d at 276, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 841. See also Gordon, 49 Cal. 2d at 694,
321 P.2d at 459.
170. It must be remembered, however, that the restrictions on an individual's ability to
seek gainful employment are disfavored by California law. See supra notes 43-48 and accom-
panying text.
171. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text for type of agreement which does
not clarify the confidentiality of the information.
172. 1 R. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 3.02(1)(d) (1987) (Rel. 24-5/87).
173. See Better Protection, supra note 1, at 53. See also Moss, Adams & Co., 179 Cal.
App. 3d at 130, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 459; American Paper, 183 Cal. App. 3d at 1325, 228 Cal.
Rptr. at 717; State Farm Ins. Co. v. Dempster, 174 Cal. App. 2d 418, 426, 344 P.2d 821,
825-26 (1959).
174. 1 R. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 3.02 (1987) (Rel. 24-5/87).
175. Id.
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in the minds of employees who otherwise may never have been
aware of the value of such information. 1 6 However, this risk seems
negligible compared to the benefits derived from written agreements.
b. A Written Definition
In the absence of a written employee agreement, a written trade
secret definition secured in a relatively inaccessible, safe place, is
preferable to no definitional secrecy measure at all. In terms of ap-
prising employees of the secrecy of any given information, review of
a written definition of the secret information should be no less
effective than the execution of a written employee agreement. Addi-
tionally, in the event of litigation, where the defined information can
in fact be protected as a trade secret, such a written definition should
enable the plaintiff-employer to establish the existence of a trade se-
cret necessary to support a claim for misappropriation.
The danger of relying on a simple written definition is that un-
less the employee signs some type of written acknowledgment, the
employer will have no written proof that the defendant-employee
was ever informed of the confidential nature of the information. The
employer may then be unable to prove that the information was the
subject of reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy and, therefore,
unable to prove the existence of the trade secret."' Even if the
employer is able to prove that such secrecy precautions were
undertaken, the employer will be entitled to relief only if it can be
established that: (1) the employee's disclosure was in breach of an
implied contract which, by operation of law, is conferred upon the
relationship between the parties; or (2) the wrongful use and disclo-
sure is found to be in breach of duties arising out of a confidential
relationship. 17 8
2. Choice of Procedure
Regardless of the definitional approach to trade secret protec-
tion selected, that procedure should be implemented at the outset of
an individual's employment, if possible. The dictates of each particu-
lar business or organization will likely determine what method is
chosen. On balance, it would appear that trade secret protection will
more likely be secured with, rather than without, the existence of a
176. Id.
177. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 3426.1(d)(2) (West Supp. 1987).
178. 1 R. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 4.01 (1987) (Rel. 22-8/86). See
also CAL. CIv. CODE § 3426.1(b)(2)(B)(ii) (West Supp. 1987).
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written agreement which prevents the use and disclosure of secret
information so labeled in an agreement. 79
VI. CONCLUSION
No information can be guaranteed trade secret protection by
virtue of its substance or content. Information will receive such pro-
tection only if affirmative steps are taken to establish its trade secret
status and to preserve its secrecy. An employer can obtain such pro-
tection by specifically defining his or her trade secrets to employees
who have access to that information. Thus, employees will be aware
of the information considered confidential and not to be used or dis-
closed outside of the business. Moreover, the specific definition
should establish the existence of a trade secret by identifying the in-
formation claimed to be secret and by representing evidence of "rea-
sonable efforts to maintain secrecy." Consequently, a specific defini-
tion of information subject to trade secret protection, conveyed to
employees exposed to that information, will greatly enhance the like-
lihood of future judicial protection.
Julie A. Henderson
179. If such an agreement is executed after the commencement of employment, restric-
tive covenants may be unenforceable unless "new" consideration is furnished. However, if
supported by actual facts, an employer should provide in such an agreement that the agree-
ment simply confirms already existing policies made known to employees at the outset of em-
ployment. Gilburne and Johnston, Trade Secret Protection for Software Generally and in the
Mass Market, 3 COMPUTER L.J. 211, 222-23 (1982).
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